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Transborder Data Flow: Problems with
the Council of Europe Convention, or
Protecting States from Protectionism
I.

INTRODUCTION

The world currently collects, processes, stores, and communicates

more data than ever previously possible. Rapid advancements in computer and communications technology since World War II, making
possible the current level of data usage, show no signs of slowing
down.' Recently, remote access computers and computer-satellite links
have rendered the transfer of data from one country to another commonplace.2 The growth of information use and data services has neces-

sitated a redefinition of information which, consequently, has given rise
to a new awareness regarding the economic utility of information.3
I William Fishman cites the research and development undertaken in connection with World
War II as the cause of enormous advances in computer and communications technology and the
corresponding reductions in costs of providing high quality communication links. Fishman, Introduction to TransborderDataFlows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1980). Additionally, progress in the
semi-conductor field has produced a tenfold decrease in the cost of computation every five years.
One commentator notes that such rapid advancements will soon make even the most fast and
efficient machines of today seem "unwieldy." Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13
IND. L. REv. 681, 687 (1980).
2 For example, Control Data Corporation's computer centers, combined with communication
links, establish "a worldwide data processing network which allows a user almost anywhere in the
free world to have unlimited computer power at their fingertips." InternationalData Flow: Hearings Before the Subcomra on Gov't InformationandIndividualRights ofthe House Comm. on Gov't
Operations,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980) (statement of Philip C. Onstad, Director, Telecommunications Policies, Control Data Corp.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];see generally Fishman, supra
note I, at 7-8.
Although the lack of commonly accepted definitions may make the measurement of such
data services difficult, these service networks are often classified as the "infrastructure of international business and government operations." Shickich, TransborderDataFlow, 11 L. & COMPTJER TECH. 62, 64 (1979). The enormous amount of information crossing borders on a daily
basis also attests to the growth and importance of this industry. See Emmett, Strangulation of
WorldEconomies, DATAmATION, Mar. 1978, at 201.
3 The chairman of Burroughs Corporation recently stated that information has become a true
product. In arriving at this conclusion, the chairman noted that the perception, as well as the
definition, of information has evolved from a traditional notion of information as the material and
supplies that support other activities to a notion of information as the central process itself, around
which all else revolves. Speech by W.M. Blumenthal, Transborder Data Flow and the New Protectionism, before the National Computer Conference (May 6, 1981), reprintedin VITAL SPEECHES
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Along with this new world perspective regarding information's economic value,4 new legal concerns are developing in the United States
and abroad. During the past decade, several European countries have
enacted data protection laws5 designed to protect individuals from the
possible abuse of personally identifiable, computerized data. 6 This legislation goes beyond regulating domestic use of computer data to place
restrictions on the transfer of personally identifiable data across national borders.7 The implications of these national laws for international trade and business are prominent topics of international legal
debate.' Recently, the Council of Europe 9 finalized a convention on
transborder flow of personal data. 10 The proposed Council of Europe
OF THE DAY, July 1, 1981, at 551. Similarly, two management consultants recently told a group of
corporate representatives that corporate data is a resource as important as cash, and should be
managed accordingly. Johnson, Treat Data as Manageable Resource, Firms Told, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 30, 1981, at 35.
4 See Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in TransnationalData Processing Systems, 16
STAN. J. INT'L L. 67, 68 (1980); Hearings,supra note 2, at 174 (statement of John Eger, Attorney).
5 Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden now have data protection statutes enacted. Appendix III ExplanatoryReport on
the Draft Conventionfor the Protection of Individuals with Regardto Automatic Processingof Personal Data, EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON LEGAL COOPERATION MEETING REPORT 20, 22, para. 5
(1980) (a copy of this report is on file at the offices of the NorthwesternJournaloflnternationalLaw
& Business) [hereinafter cited as ExplanatoryReport]. Belgium, Iceland, The Netherlands, Spain,
and Switzerland have legislation under consideration. Id. Austria, Portugal, and Spain have incorporated data protection as a fundamental right in their respective constitutions. Id
6 Data prot&ftion laws have been defined as laws enacted for "the protection of the rights,
freedoms, and essential interests of persons vis-a-vis the processing of personal information relating to them, particularly when computers aid in the processing procedure." Hondius, DataLaw in
Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87, 89 (1980). The emphasis is placed on regulation of the processing, maintenance, and communication of data rather than on the regulation of the actual content.
In that sense, these laws regulate information in an indirect manner. See generally Note, Contracts
for TransnationalInformation Services. Securing Equivalency of DataProtection,22 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 157 (1981).
7 For discussion of the major foreign national provisions, see infra text accompanying notes
44-69.
8 Data protection has been recognized as a new branch of law formulated especially for handling the issue of invasion of privacy in regard to computerized data. At the base of the controversy lies the question of whether the law can ever keep pace with a rapidly changing science. See
Hondius, Computers: Data Privacy, IEEE SPECTRUM, Mar. 1980, at 67 [hereinafter cited as
Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy].
9 The Council of Europe at its inception in 1948 had 17 member nations; it has now grown to
encompass 21 European countries. The Council has been especially concerned with the protection
of human rights and the promotion of unity among its members, as well as respect for the Rule of
Law. Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted May 5, 1949, ch. 1, art. 1(a), 87 U.N.T.S. 103. See
generally Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy, supra note 8, at 68.
10 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, openedfor signature Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter cited as C.O.E.
Convention].
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Convention, as well as other efforts at international agreements,' attempt to prevent unnecessary restrictions on information movement by
harmonizing often conflicting national laws. However, even an international agreement may unduly burden international trade and business, if the practical effect of its terms is overly severe.
This comment will discuss the current status of national data protection laws and their effect on the conflict between the individual interest in retaining personal privacy and the business interest in
preserving the free flow of information. Such discussion will highlight
the consequences of the proposed Council of Europe Convention's regulation of personal data. 2 A brief look at the history of the information
industry, as well as the costs of and justifications for transborder data
flow, will serve to establish a framework for the issues and controversies which the Convention addresses. The comment will also focus on
specific provisions of the Council of Europe Convention to ascertain its
potential burden on international business and potential impact on
American trade, suggesting that the present terms of the treaty unnecessarily hamper the conduct of trade. Finally, several improvements will
be proposed for future international agreements, emphasizing the role
of the United States in developing such agreements.
II.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The difficulty in formulating set standards for transborder data
flow results from the need to balance two equally important, though
competing, interests. The first interest is the economic necessity for free
access to information in order to engage in trade or business activities
profitably. In opposition to this interest, however, is the fundamental
right of individuals to preserve their privacy by limiting the release of
any information which personally concerns them. Consequently, an
understanding of the two interests' significance and the interplay beI1 While several international organizations have considered the issue of transborder data
flow, at the present time, the most significant proposal besides the C.O.E. Convention is a set of
voluntary guidelines created by an expert group of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, adopted Sept. 23, 1979; see also Guidelines Recommendations of the Council
Governing the Protection of Privacy ana Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doe.
C(80)58 (Oct. 1, 1980).
12 Personal data is information regarding an individual and may be recorded or stored on
paper in a computer's memory bank. See Note, supra note 6, at 158. For the purposes of this

comment, "data" will be limited to automatically processed personal data as in the C.O.E. Convention. Such data have been reduced to numbers and symbols which the computer can manipu-

late and produce upon command as a computer print-out. Id.
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tween them is a prerequisite to a proper evaluation of the impact of any

data protection law or agreement.
The complexity of international business today places a premium
on the speed and accuracy of information flow. No longer can business

transactions profitably occur over a number of days. In order to benefit
from innumerable business opportunities, transactions must occur in
hours, or even minutes.I3 Since a large part of international business
decisions today take place in multinational corporations with branches
in various parts of the world, 14 computerized communication links are
the only means to achieve the necessary transmission speed. Similarly,

computerized filing systems that quickly analyze complex bodies of information are essential to efficient and profitable business operations.' 5
Information electronically transmitted or stored tends to be less ambiguous because it has been reduced to the computer's binary series of
choices.' 6 The data's reliability and accuracy is thus increased, gener17
ating better informed and more efficient business decisions.
The United States has a special interest in maintaining the free
flow of information. Information flow is likely to control almost all
trade, either because trade consists directly of information exchanges,
or because the conduct of trade is totally dependent on information
exchange systems.' 8 Since the United States is currently the world
leader in information technology and trade,"' international restrictions
on the information industry most likely will affect United States business interests more than those of any other country.2" There could be a
severe reduction in the currently massive amounts of United States rev13 For example, IBM conducts business in 120 countries and new technology makes possible
the rapid exchange of enormous quantities of data over substantial distances, enabling IBM to
maintain its world-wide operation. Hearings,supra note 2, at 3 (statement of John Rankine, VicePresident of IBM). See also Eger, Emerging Restrictions on TransnationalDataFlows: Privacy
Protectionor Non-Tarri' Trade Barriers? 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1055, 1060 (1978).
14 It has been predicted that multinationals, the heavy users of international data, will account
for up to 20% of the world GNP by 1985. Fishman, supra note 1, at 13.
15 Noll, The Interactionsof Computers and Privacy, 7 HONEYWELL COMPUTER J. 163, 168
(1973).
16 Information is fed into a computer as a series of numbers consisting of ones and zeros; this
is the binary number system. Thus, at the risk of over-simplification, the computer is nothing
more than a series of devices which have only two states, on or off. Since there is no in-between
state, information stored, analyzed, or transmitted by the computer is subject to little, if any,
distortion. The resulting reduction in ambiguity increases the reliability of computerized data.
17 See R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL IssuEs 2 (1977).

18 McGuire, The Information Age. An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1 (1979).
19 Hearings, supra note 2, at 327 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce). See also Shickich, supra note 2, at 64.
20 Eger, supra note 13, at 1056.
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enue from the international information industry"1 if burdensome regulations decrease the utility of information exchange systems.
The incentive to preserve the free flow of information, along with

the increased mobility of data, effectively generates a concern for the
protection of personal privacy. The concern stems from feared misuse
of computerized data. The conflict between the two interests is important because both the right to freedom of information and the right to

privacy are fundamental human liberties. 2
It is important here to distinguish between individual and corporate privacy interests.23 The corporate privacy interest is a practical
business interest in protecting the profitability of the enterprise involved, and does not flow from any notion of human rights.2 4 The extension of data protection laws to cover this non-fundamental
corporate interest could have disastrous consequences from two perspectives. First, the transmission of information within a company is
often essential to the company's operations. For example, a firm's
main office may need to consolidate corporate records identifying employees so that it knows what skills and resources are available. Curtailment

of such information flow could severely hinder the

enterprise.25 Second, where one company possesses information about

21 By 1978, telecommunication and information goods had more than doubled their 1972 export total. This sector, together with agriculture and aviation, currently leads the United States
export market. Hearings,supra note 2, at 325-26 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce). In 1980, foreign revenues accounted for 42% of total revenues of the top 50 United
States companies in the data processing field. Id. at 521 (statement of Abraham Katz, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy). Fifty-six percent of all large data
bases for service networks are in the United States, and these account for more than 80% of worldwide transmissions. Speech by W.M. Blumenthal, supra note 3, reprintedin VITAL SPEECHES OF
THE DAY at 552. Further evidence of the information industry as a major revenue producer is its
place in the American workforce. A recent study shows that approximately 46% of the American
workforce is comprised of "information workers," and it is estimated that in a few years 70% of all
labor income will be from "information activity." Hearings,supra note 2, at 203-04 (statement of
John Eger, Attorney).
22 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, enteredintoforce Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
The Human Rights Convention recognizes both the right to freedom of information, id. art. 10,
and the right to private and family life, id. art. 8, as fundamental. Since both are viewed as
fundamental human rights, neither interest may be promoted to the exclusion of the other. The
necessity of maintaining an equilibrium between these rights renders any solution to the conflict
involved in transborder data flow much more difficult.
23 Individual or personal privacy refers to questions applying to natural persons as opposed to
corporate privacy which applies the same principles to juristic persons, such as associations, foundations, and corporations. For a general discussion of the distinction between these interests and
the foundations of each, see Grossman, TransborderData How: Separatingthe Privacy Interests of
Individualsand Corporations,4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 12-18 (1982).
24 .d. at 15-17.
25
Id. at 16.
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another company, required submission of data bases to a competitor
for inspection or correction may render conventional marketing prac-

tices ineffective. 26 The release of any data base may provide the competitor with an unfair advantage by allowing the competitor to falsify
its own marketing practices as an alleged correction, and simultaneously providing it with access to otherwise unavailable information regarding the first company's product development and marketing
strategies.2 7 Thus, the privacy interest at issue in transborder data flow
legislation should be limited to individual privacy interests.
Prior to the advent of the computer, little information was stored
because of the lack of facilities and high storage costs. Thus, there was
little opportunity to misuse stored information. Additionally, the en-

tity in possession of the data (the data controller) was often known to
the person about whom the data was stored (the data subject), since

the two parties were usually within reasonable proximity. Consequently, a degree of deterrence existed, preventing unauthorized disclosures. With the development of computers, it is now possible to store

enormous amounts of data in relatively small spaces, at minimum
costs, and without the data subject's knowledge. 28 Also, the data con-

troller is now physically distant from the data subject and often cannot
be traced.29 Therefore, it is less likely that the data controller will be
deterred from disclosing data without the data subject's authorization.
Furthermore, computer advances enable more integration and centrali-

zation of information, 30 again increasing the danger of information
misuse.
Although computer advances compound the perceived possibility
of an invasion of privacy,3 it would be senseless to argue for a return
26 Id.
27 The potential impact of requiring juristic persons to license all their data bases on market-

ing, product development, and competitive pricing is "staggering." McGuire, supra note 18, at 6.
28 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 5.
29 A 1973 United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare report noted three
changes that the computer brought to information processing. Computer advances created a new
class of record-keepers who performed technical tasks and whose contact with suppliers and users
of data was remote. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS 12 (1973).

30 Halls, Raiding the Databanks.- A Developing Problemfor Technologists and Lawyers, 5 J.
CONTEMP. L. 245, 246 (1978). Formerly, it was too expensive and time-consuming to centralize
information, and the consequent disorganization prevented access. Today, information is concentrated and the technology enables data banks to combine so that a 20 page dossier on every person
in the United States could be available in four minutes. Id.
31 A Louis Harris Association's survey in the United States for Sentry Insurance Co. found
that Americans view the computer as a major threat to personal privacy. Fifty-three percent of
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to the old method of information storage and exchange. The computer
is here to stay and its benefits are widely recognized. 32 The extensive
use of the computer in both the public33 and private 34 sectors attests to
current dependence on the computer. Thus, a transformation in tradi-

tional notions of privacy is necessary to accommodate new technologi35
cal developments. The notion of privacy as a deeply personal interest
should not be maintained in a society where impersonal machines

quickly gather vast amounts of personal information. The idea of a
personal privacy sphere simply is inconsistent with information's special character, because once the information is disclosed, sole control
over the information is lost. 36 The recipient cannot be forced to forget
the information received. Instead, privacy should be considered more

broadly as an interest in "fair record management.

37

Most people will

accept the existence of data storage as a consequence of modem life. It

is only the potential misuse of this stored data that concerns them.38
Hence, the data collection itself is seldom the issue; rather, the question
is how to ensure the fairness of the subsequent use of the data.3 9 Data

protection laws should, therefore, impose duties on parties handling the
particular information, instead of imposing restricitions on data collection itself.'
those questioned stated that they thought the present use of computers was a threat. Public Concern on Privacy isGrowing, DATAPROCESSING, July 1979, at 8.
32 The benefits of information flow fall into four functional categories: (1) sharing scientific or
technological information; (2) transferring statistical research data; (3) sharing administrative information such as police files or health records; and (4) facilitating economic activities, such as
airline reservations, credit agencies, and management of multinationals. Transborder data flow
between the parent and branch offices of multinational corporations, falling into the fourth category, is probably the most prevalent, but this by no means diminishes the importance of transborder data flow in other functional categories. See Pipe, Work Paperon TransborderInformation
Flows: Requirementsfora New InternationalFramework, 9 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 17, 20 (1976).
33 Organizations such as law enforcement agencies (INTERPOL), military conferences
(NATO), as well as weather service bureaus and immigration services, depend on international
computer links. For a more complete list, see id at 21.
34 Dependence on computer networks in the private sector covers categories such as credit and
banking, travel, corporate management, churches, labor organizations, and more. Id.
35 See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (right to be left
alone); Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy, supra note 8, at 68 (private sphere into which others
should not intrude without consent).
36 Hondius, supra note 6, at 96.
37 Fishman, supra note 1, at 5.
38 Skelly, BalancingPrivacy andEfficiency in an Electronic World, 12 L. & COMPUTER TECH.
38, 41 (1979).
39 See Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy, supra note 8, at 68. See also Note, supra note 6, at
161.
40 Hondius, supra note 6, at 96-97. A machine is totally neutral, as is information; therefore,
any misuse of the data must originate from the people who are in control of the information. See
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Even though individual privacy interests may require protection
where corporate privacy interests do not,41 there is no absolute right to
personal privacy.42 Unless a legitimate personal privacy interest is involved, the use of data protection laws to restrict information flow is
not justified. The existence of the competing interest in free access to
information necessitates extra caution to avoid over-regulation which
inhibits the efficient conduct of trade and business. A proper balance is

necessary before imposing restrictions on the transborder flow of
data.4 3

III.

NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION STATUTES

Current national legislation serves as an example of the difficulty

involved in reaching an equilibrium between the two interests at stake
in transborder data flow. The impact of national data protection laws
on the international information industry44 is the same whether the legislation is in response to a perceived threat to privacy or is due solely to
the self-interest of the enacting nation. 45 The current difficulty in
maintaining a balance between privacy and the free flow of information results from two factors. National laws are contrary to the inherent international character of computerized data and other information
transfers.' A second and related reason is that there are highly diversiC. TAPPER, COMPUTER LAW 127 (1978) (immorality and incompetence are human vices and not
mechanical feelings).
41 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 12-15.
42 See generally Fishman, supra note 1, at 20 (discussion of OECD Guidelines recognizes that
personal data will move across national borders); Dreyfack, Europeans Tighten DataFlow, ELECTRONICS, Feb. 10, 1981, at 106.
43 Fishman, supra note 1, at 20. One commentator noted that even though personal privacy is
a rationale for regulation that many nations readily accept, this rationale is quickly becoming
secondary to other more harmful rationales. McGuire, supra note 18, at 3.
44 At least three subparts form the information industry: (1) the export of computers and
communications equipment; (2) the foreign market for United States data processing services; and
(3) the transmission of information necessary for multinational enterprises to operate. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 216 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary, Department of State). Current data protection legislation, with its provisions restricting data entering and leaving the country, will most drastically affect the transmission of information vital to multinationals. However,
the legislation may also adversely affect both the export of communications equipment and the
international market for data processing. Id.
45 Hearings, supra note 2, at 203 (statement of John Eger); Note, supra note 6, at 168.
46 Information travels irrespective of national boundaries, thereby making it inherently international in character. Professor Knut Selmer, the chairman of the Norwegian Research Center for
Computers and the Law, recently related an example of the impossibility of regulating transborder flows of information: during World War II, Norwegians used secret radios after the
Germans confiscated all radio equipment in an effort to contain and control information flow.
Scannell, Issues of TransborderData Flow Seen Missed, COMPtJTERWORLD, Feb. 2, 1981, at 18
(report on Knut Selmer's speech before the First International Symposium on Computer Security
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fled perceptions among nations regarding the best method to protect
privacy adequately. The national character of laws enables such differences to develop. Thus, even though agreement exists on basic principles underlying data protection, national laws may prevent the
application of those principles.
Sweden enacted the first law regulating the transborder flow of information. 47 This statute has since served as a model for most other
European data protection laws.48 The purpose behind its enactment
was to assure Swedish citizens that personal information would only be
used for purposes consistent with that for which it was collected.4 9 The
most prominent feature of this act is the provision establishing a Data
Inspection Board (DIB) empowered to license all data bases within the
country. 50 The DIB's regulatory powers and duties are broad and discretionary. It bases its licensing decisions merely on the kind and
quantity of data stored,51 and other data characteristics subject to discretionary judgment. Almost all European countries have authorized a
similar regulatory agency to enforce their privacy protection laws."
The DIB also monitors all information transmitted from the country.5 3
Often, the DIB may prevent data removal simply because the nation
receiving the information is perceived to have inadequate protection
for the data.54
and Privacy). See also Hearings,supra note 2, at 227 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary, Department of State).
47 Data Act, No. 289, 1973 Svensk Forfattnings Samling [SFS] 518 (Swed.), as amendedby Act
of June 12, 1979, No. 334, 1979 [SFS] 727 (Swed.), effective July 1, 1979, reprintedin 5 COMPUTER
L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 2 [hereinafter citied as Swedish Data Act].
48 See Shickich, supra note 2, at 68. See also Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy,supra note 8,
at 68.
49 See Eger, supra note 13, at 1072.
50 Swedish Data Act, supra note 47, § 2. Section 2 states: "A personal file may not be set up
or kept without permission from the Data Inspection Board. The setting up of a personal file
means also collection of data to be included in the fie."
51 Id. § 3. Section 3, in pertinent part, provides:
The Data Inspection Board shall grant permission to set up. . . a personal file if there is no
reason to assume that ... undue encroachment upon the privacy of registered persons will
occur.
In judging whether undue encroachment may occur special attention shall be paid to the
nature and quantity of the personal data to be recorded in the fie, to how and from whom the
data are to be collected, and to the attitude to the fie... assumed to be held by the persons
who may be registered.
52 Hearings, supra note 2, at 336 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce). The European data protection laws generally establish a privacy protection standard and
an administrative enforcement mechanism.
53 Eger, supra note 13, at 1070; Shickich, supra note 2, at 68. Any data to be transmitted
outside of the nation must be submitted to the DIB for inspection prior to transmission.
54 For example, a small Swedish town sought a British firm to produce health identification
cards for its residents. The Swedish DIB, however, would not authorize the release of the health
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The monitoring function is not confined to disallowing the transfer
of data to those countries without adequate safeguards. Regulations

also restrict data flow where the laws of two countries partially conflict,
even though both laws are designed to generate adequate data protection. For example, the German Data Protection Act incorporates tech-

nical security standards to prevent the receiving country from altering
the received data.55 In essence, this regulation may prevent the receiv-

ing country from decoding data received to process or store it. Serious
legal complications may result if the receiving nation has laws similar
to those of the United Kingdom, where the British Post prohibits the
56
receipt of coded data unless it is supplied with the key to the code.

Such conflicting provisions may well produce an irresolvable dilemma
which will severely curtail or totally block information flow. Although
monitoring activities authorized in these older European statutes may
unduly hinder the free flow of information, the laws are at least limited

to personally identifiable data. Some of the more recent data protection statutes have extended data protection to juristic persons (corporations, foundations, and other associations), and have restricted the

transfer of information concerning such entities. 57 The basis of legislainformation to the British firm, despite a contractual provision that no copies of the records would
be made, because the United Kingdom lacked "insurance in terms of law or administrative authority against stealing or further use of this population file." Pantages & Pipe, .4 New Headache
for InternationalDP, DATAMATION, June 1977, at 115, 118. Similarly, before Germany enacted
its data protection statute, a German based corporation wishing to centralize its corporate personnel files was unable to consolidate its records on Swedish employees with its other personnel
materials in Munich. Id.
In the United States, Michael Blumenthal, chairman of Burroughs Corporation, stated that
Burroughs' system to make information available on employee skills was in jeopardy. The West
German legal counsel had advised Burroughs that the very existence of the system would require
government approval and the establishment of confidentiality guarantees. Even then, there were
no assurances that later use of the system would not be obstructed. Speech by W.M. Blumenthal,
supra note 3, reprintedin VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY at 553. Blumenthal additionally noted
that Burroughs was already having difficulties with its regional computer systems designed to
diagnose problems in customer's computers and to transmit information from the central computer to guide on-site repairs. The Canadian government refused to allow the system to be
hooked up to a Canadian computer which needed hardware repairs. Id.
55 Federal Data Protection Act, 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt I 201 (W. Ger.), reprintedin 5 CoMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 3. Section 6(l), in pertinent part, states: "Persons processing
personal data. . . shall take the technical and organizational measures necessary to ensure the
implementation of the provisions of this Law, and in particular the requirements set out in the
Annex to this Law." Paragraph 9 of the Annex to Section 6(1) states: "It shall be ensured that
data cannot be read, modified or erased without authorization during their communication or
during the transport of relevant storage media (transport control)."
56 Eger, supra note 13, at 1074.
57 In 1977 and 1978, Austria, Denmark, and Norway enacted privacy legislation extending to
legal entities. The Norwegian Privacy Act, section 1, provides: "The term 'personal information'
shall mean information ... directly or indirectly, traceable to identifiable individuals, associa-

610
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tion concerning commercial privacy is intrinsically weaker and the

need for the free flow of information is much more compelling.58
The United States approach to privacy legislation differs signifi-

cantly from the European approach. The most prominent differences
lie in the United States refusal to adopt a sweeping, omnibus approach

to privacy legislation, choosing instead to adopt a sector by sector legislative policy as specific privacy problems arise.5 9 Additionally, the
United States relies on judicial enforcement of privacy, rather than on
a regulatory agency approach. 0 From the European perspective, these
differences render data protection in the United States impermissibly
lax. This may result in the blockage of data flow to the United States,
since the European laws do not allow the transmission of data to states
with inadequate protection. Any such blockage would cause significant
harm to United States industries by increasing the cost of obtaining
vital operating information.6 Therefore, even though American and

European data protection begin from the same notion of "fair record
management,"6 2 the United States task is to convince European nations

that the American approach to data protection will ensure adequate or
equivalent protection for data stored and processed in the United
States.63

Presently, there may be gaps in American legislation, but these
gaps are due less to the inadequacy of existing legislation than to the
tions or foundations." Personal Data Registers Act, No. 48 (June 9, 1978) (Nor.), reprintedin 5
COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 5.
Both the Danish Private and Public Register Acts of 1978 provide: "this Act shall apply to
registers kept for specified companies, institutions, associations and the like that cannot be classified as part of the public administration .... (Public Authorities Registers Act, 1978, see. 2)."
Private Registers Etc. Act, No. 293, 1978 Lovtidende for Kongeriget Danmark [LKDk] A833
(Den.), reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. SERV. app. 9-5.2a, No. 6; Public Authorities' Registers Act,
No. 294, 1978 LKDk A 839 (Den.), reprintedin 5 COMPUTER L. SERv. app. 9-5.2a, No. 7.
The Austrian Federal Act of 18th October, 1978, on the Protection of Personal Data provides,
in article 2, part 1, paragraph 2: "Persons affected: natural or legal persons or associations of
persons under commercial law, about whom data are collected, processed or disclosed." Data
Protection Act, No. 565, 1978 Bundesgesetzblatt fair die Rupublik Osterreich [BGBI(] 3619
(Aus.), reprintedin 5 COMPUTER L. SERv. app. 9-5.2a, No. 8.
58 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
59 Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy, supra note 8, at 70.
60 Hearings, supra note 2, at 338 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce); Fishman, supra note 1, at 5.
61 See Note, supra note 6, at 163.
62 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
63 Several commentators think that United States law is at least as adequate as European
privacy legislation, and may actually be broader. Turn, supra note 4, at 76; Hearings,supra note
2, at 318 (statement ofHenry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce). Therefore, the problem is
merely one of convincing European states.
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non-existence of legislation for certain types of data.' Furthermore,
these gaps result more from the differences encountered in a common
law as opposed to a civil law system, than from a lack of concern for
privacy. 65 In fact, the United States has strongly advocated privacy
protection where need has been demonstrated.66 Although further
United States privacy legislation may increase the opportunity for
greater data flow from Europe to the United States, American trade
and business may benefit most by seeking international agreement to
harmonize, and perhaps to equalize, the national legislation of all
countries. This will prevent each government from extending its nation's privacy legislation beyond its legitimate perimeter in an effort to
further protectionist policies, since there would be an extra-national
check on such misuse. 67 Despite the fact that the free flow of information is not an absolute value,68 the over-extension of data protection
laws conflicts with the principles underlying currently existing international fair trade legislation. 69 The only way to avoid this economic
protectionism is to seek an international agreement that will limit the
amount of permissible regulation.
64 The adoption of a sector by sector approach has led to limited protective legislation in areas
such as credit information or educational information. See generally Hondius, Computers: Data
Privacy,supra note 8, at 70. This, in effect, has left other types of information such as medical and
research records without any privacy protection. However, even these areas have been or are
under consideration for legislative action. See H.R. 5935 and S. 305, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
(bill concerning confidentiality of medical records); H.R. 3409 and S. 867, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) (bill concerning confidentiality of records collected during the process of research).
65 The United States common law system has been characterized as only limiting freedoms
after a harm has occurred, whereas the European civil law system tends to legislate first to prevent
the possible occurrence of any mischief. Turn, supra note 4, at 76. Therefore, the non-existence of
protection in certain areas of data collection in the United States is due more to the approach
taken in regard to the legislative process, than to a policy that legislation is not necessary.
66 The United States legislative record in the area of privacy proves that the United States has
a strong concern for civil rights and the protection of personal privacy. For example, the United
States Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), is a powerful tool to protect
government records from abuse at the federal level. In the private sector, again, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §1232g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), both offer substantial privacy
protection. Hearings, supra note 2, at 337 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce).
67 Hearings, supra note 2, at 220-21 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary, Department of State).
68 See generally Fishman, supra note I, at 20; Dreyfack, supra note 42, at 106.
69 See generally General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed Oct. 30, 1947, enteredinto force Jan. 1, 1948, 61 Stat. A 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. while this agreement concerns tariff and non-tariff barriers only in regard to the trade of goods or products, the
'principal requirement of fair trade on an international level may be applicable to services such as
telecommunications.
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IV.

THE COSTS OF RESTRICTED INFORMATION FLOW

The costs resulting from regulation of information flow emphasize
the need to limit regulation to narrowly-defined exceptional circumstances. The costs of transborder data flow restriction are based on the
notion that humans are social creatures with a need to share knowledge
in an effort to organize the world more efficiently for the mutual benefit
of all.70 The specific harm resulting from data protection laws depends
on the type of information involved. Traditionally, transborder data
flow occurs for four reasons. The first three reasons relate to the public
sector of information transfer, while the fourth category pertains to the
private sector: (1)the transfer of scientific and technological information; (2) the transfer of administrative data, such as police files or disease control data; (3) the transfer of statistical data; and (4) the transfer
of economic or commercial data. 7' Governments or international
agencies almost exclusively initiate public sector transfers. Data protection laws are less likely to produce harmful effects in this sector since
bilateral agreements often resolve questions concerning the use of
data.72 Still, in a world of constantly shifting international relations,
the potential for ignoring such agreements exists, depending upon the
degree to which current relations with the other nations are amicable
and cooperative. In this sense, a multilateral treaty may afford more
effective privacy protection. Over time, nations may begin to accept
the wide-spread principles contained in a multilateral treaty as international customary norms. Even this protection, however, may not be
enough to ensure sufficient free flow of information when one considers
73
that the fullest possible knowledge is vital to proper decisionmaking.
In contrast to public sector regulation, data protection laws have
70 John Pierce, of the California Institute ofTechnology, wrote: "Without external communication we might live, but we would be ignorant, lonely individuals. We would have neither the

inspiration of accumulated skill and knowledge nor the support of a society." Pierce, Communication, Sci. AM., Sept. 1972, at 31. Similarly, John Eger has stated that information flow benefits
groups and nations by reducing the'ignorance and misunderstandings that are often the source of
conflicts. In this sense, Eger states: "Barriers to free flow can only constitute a rear guard action in

the growth of the global community in economic, social, and cultural terms." Hearings, supra
note 2, at 210 (statement of John Eger, Attorney).
71 See Pipe, supra note 32, at 20.

72 Grossman, supra note 23, at 8.
73 In a fall 1980 report to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organiza-

tion, the significance of information was set out: "The flow of technical information within nations and across national boundaries is a major resource for development. Access to such
information, which countries need for technical decisionmaking at all levels, is as crucial as access
to news sources." McCarter, Nations Seeking Limits on TDF, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 3, 1981, at

53. While this report was specifically concerned with technical and scientific information, its implications extend to all data necessary to various types of decisionmaking.
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great potential for producing harmful effects in the private sector,
where information transfers consist of economic and commercial data
and are not subject to prior bilateral agreements. The private sector,
accordingly, has always been more susceptible to regulation with respect to transborder flow. 4 Data flow restrictions in the private sector
certainly have more potential for an outright financial impact." In addition, the restrictive impact of data protection laws in this sector, while
imposing costs on the country seeking the data, is also likely to impose
both political and economic costs on the domestic sectors of the nation
with the data protection law.7 6 Comparatively, the domestic costs may
outweigh any benefits to the country enacting this type of privacy
legislation.
One potential domestic cost of data protection legislation is that it
prevents organizations from seeking data processing service abroad.
This results in lost revenue to the country offering the processing services by reducing the market for services that it offers.7 7 However, the
enterprise seeking services outside its own country is also harmed because it is forced to seek alternatives to what it presumably chose as the
best processing service.7" Costs result when the enterprise must turn to
less adequate processing services or pay a higher price for equivalent
services.79 A second cost is that data protection laws often prohibit the
import of foreign computer equipment.8 0 This again results in lost revenue to the exporting nation since the market for its computer equipment is reduced."1 It may, however, injure the potential importing
74 Grossman, supra note 23, at 9.
75 The potential for large revenue loss exists if foreign data protection laws are enforced with
respect to the United States. Foreign revenues accounted for 42% of the total data processing
revenues of the top 50 data processing companies in the United States. Hearings,supra note 1, at
521 (statement of Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary of Commerce). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
76 Note, supra note 6, at 169. The costs to the nation with data protection laws generally result
from the discontent within the private sector due to the additional expenses the enterprises must
undertake.
77 See Hearings,supra note 2, at 216 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary, Depart-

ment of State).
78 It is assumed that every rational enterprise will act in the most cost efficient manner by
selecting the best services available for its needs at the lowest price. This also assumes that there is
more than one service from which to choose.
79 For a more detailed account of this notion of cost, see Note, supra note 6, at 169.
80 Many United States observers believe that data protection is used to ensure Europe's control over new digital communication techniques. Dreyfack, supra note 42, at 106. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 402 (statement of Russell Pipe, President of Transnational Data Reporting
Service, Inc.).
81 Hearings,supra note 2, at 216 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary, Department
of State).
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nation as well, if that nation does not have the requisite technology or

capabilities to develop equivalent computer systems.82 Even though
data protection legislation is designed to encourage the development of

domestic technological capabilities, the domestic enterprises will be
harmed if forced to forego needed advanced computer equipment, or to

pay a significantly higher price for the domestic production of such
equipment.
Within the private sector of information transfer, costs result from
a reduced flow of vital information from branches of an enterprise lo-

cated in countries with data protection laws.13 In this situation, the

multinational is presented with three options. First, the multinational
may regionalize its record-keeping, so that each branch in each country

maintains its own records. While this option is the most economically
beneficial for the host nation, 84 it is likely to be avoided by the multinational since it would be costly and ultimately inefficient.8 5 The second
option is to remove totally the multinational's operations from any
country with restrictive data protection laws. This option would result
in lost revenues for both the enterprise and the host nation; thus, this
alternative is also unlikely to be adopted. Finally, the enterprise may

submit the desired data to the appropriate Data Inspection Board86 and
82 Many of the countries which resist the import of information have no information technology or industry of their own. At present, they cannot hope to compete technologically with advanced nations. Eger, supra note 13, at 1065.
83 Hearings, supra note 2, at 216 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary, Department
of State). John Rankine, Vice-President of IBM, stated that information flow is needed to maintain sufficient inventory of employee skills to keep foreign customers up to date on engineering,
design, manufacturing information, and technical changes or improvements. Id. at 3.
84 Regionalization of record-keeping provides each enterprise branch office with its own data
storage unit, thus increasing employment opportunities, tax revenues, and national product within
the host nation, and decreasing the need for and costs of data regulation, since there would be
little need for transborder data flows. See Note, supra note 6, at 167-68.
85 Pantages & Pipe, supra note 54, at 116. See also Hearings,supra note 2, at 57 (responses of
Control Data Corporation). This cost may become increasingly obvious if governments which
license data processing and storage equipment begin to favor domestic data processing companies.
Michael Blumenthal, of the Burroughs Corporation, maintains that this cost is likely to occur due
to a loophole in the new GATT Multilateral Trade Agreement, which exempts telecommunications from its Government Procurement Code. This Code generally prohibits preferential treatment, but with telecommunications exempted, it could be treated preferentially. Speech by W.M.
Blumenthal, supra note 3, reprintedin VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY at 552.
86 The European data protection laws consist basically of the establishment of a privacy protection standard and an administrative mechanism, usually a regulatory type of agency known as
a Data Inspection Board (DIB), to ensure that the privacy standard is enforced. Hearings,supra
note 2, at 336 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce).
The Swedish Data Act, supra note 47, which has served as the prototype for most other data
protection statutes, requires the DIB to inspect and approve or disapprove all data leaving the
country.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

4:601(1982)

hope that the Board will approve the transfer of the most essential and
less sensitive corporate data. Costs result for the multinational enterprise since the business assumes the risk of the Board's refusal to transmit certain data. Although not as obviously, this option also will create
costs to the host country. The submission of the data to the Inspection
Board in essence is a disclosure of data and carries with it the potential
for the members of the Board to misuse the information. This may

produce high costs to the citizens of a nation supposedly protected from
abusive and unnecessary dissemination of personal information.8 7 The
number and severity of costs involved in the impairment of informa-

tion flow demonstrate that data protection laws should only apply
under narrow circumstances. The resulting encouragement of free flow
of information should prove beneficial for both the country seeking
data and the nation enacting the data protection law.
V.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTED INFORMATION FLOW

Data protection laws generally protect individuals from the abuse
and dissemination of confidential data; thus, legitimate rationales for
such protection exist. Usually, a combination of several rationales constitute the motivating force behind data protection legislation.8 8 While
each state interest or rationale by itself may be laudable, the combination of several increases the danger of extending the laws beyond their
justifiable limits. A review of these interests will underscore the difficulty in reaching the proper equilibrium between the free flow of information and the personal privacy interests so as to avoid the overregulation of international information flow. In turn, recognition of
this difficulty mandates the need for extra caution in determining any
set of standards for data regulation to prevent disguised protectionism.
The perceived need to regulate transnational data flow begins with
the territoriality of domestic laws and the potential loss of jurisdiction
and control over the use of data once it leaves the country. 9 While

several grounds may support the regulation, the result of each rationale
87 Warren Burton, Vice-President of Tymshare, Inc., a remote access data processor based in
California, recently criticized the establishment of data inspection boards: "The concept of a central government authority which knows and controls the information on all citizens and commerce
seems to contradict, in practice, the protection of human rights." Hearings,supra note 2, at 69.
See also Shickich, supra note 2, at 71.
88 For a detailed discussion of political, economic, and individual interests involved in transborder data flow, see Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, The TransborderTransfer of Informationby Communicationsand Computer Systems. Issues and Approaches to Guiding Princoles, 68 AM. J. INT'IL
L. 227, 246-54 (1974).
89

Id. at 249.
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is to manifest the government's preference for protecting, controlling,
and conserving data within its national borders, rather than importing,
exporting, or exchanging the new ideas that information offers. 90 Generally, a nation cites several grounds for its regulation, claiming privacy
protection as the primary motivation. However, the primacy of any
particular ground will vary with the involvement of different facets of
the information industry.91
One major ground for data protection legislation is the state's interest in maintaining its sovereign status and in preserving the nation's
cultural identity. 92 Governments have often exercised their sovereignty
for the welfare of their citizens by regulating the type of information
reaching their people. 93 The development of the computer has transformed this interest to regulating data entering and leaving the country.94 In essence, many foreign governments believe that the
transborder data flow out of their country, whether for processing or
storage, could result in their country becoming overly dependent on the
processing or storage country.95 Effective and efficient government decision making requires enormous amounts of information. Thus, the
degree of accessibilty to information determines the government's ability to make its own decisions. Therefore, one nation's dependence on
another for the storage of vital data could result in significant harm to
the customer nation if the storage nation limits the return of data to its
owners. There are two potential results, depending on the degree to
which the data is withheld. First, the storage nation may impose its
own value system on the customer nation by selectively releasing information to distort the decision making process. 96 Second, if the storage
nation refuses to release any of the data, the customer nation is likely to
90 Id. at 227.
91 See supra note 44.
92 Developing countries, which have long feared cultural inundation by industrialized nations,
rely heavily upon the concern for sovereignty. See McCarter, supra note 73, at 53 (third world
seeks redress for the imbalance of data flow by seeking access to world-wide data networks and
limiting access to their own domestic data bases). Underlying these restrictive measures are claims
of biased news reporting by the foreign press and the refusal of industrialized nations to share
information technology on the developing nations' terms. Eger, supra note 13, at 1081.
Developed nations are now similarly fearful of cultural inundation resulting from the foreign
storage of data. Hugh Falkner, a Canadian Minister of Science and Technology, expressed this
fear as "the danger that industrial and social development will be largely governed by the decisions of interest groups residing in another country." Id. at 1078-79.

93 For example, obscenity laws and regulation of information for national security reasons
have long been considered legitimate functions of governments. Bigelow, TransborderDataFlow
Barriers,20 JURIMETRICS J. 8 (1979).

94 See generall Fishman,supra note 1, at 20.
95 Eger, supra note 13, at 1078-79.
96 Id.
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appear indecisive and thereby lose the respect and confidence of its
people.9 7

A second rationale for data protection legislation is administrative
in nature. The government of the customer nation needs access to in-

formation in order to perform services for its citizens. 98 This rationale
again involves the dependence of the customer nation on the storage

nation to release vital information without which the customer nation's
government cannot perform essential services. The failure to perform
such services would discredit the government. Therefore, the customer

nation prefers to retain the data to avoid this result.
A third rationale involves the individual and his or her own privacy interest. 99 The government must protect the privacy rights of its
citizens. Potential invasions of privacy arise both when transborder
flows occur in the course of business between multinationals and within
multinational enterprises.

A final interest is economic protection. This rationale usually appears where the import and export of computer machinery and related
equipment is involved, but it appears also where there is data process-

ing or storage outside a nation's boundaries. This interest involves
many protectionist qualities in that the government is using data protection laws to develop its domestic computer technology and industry.10 0 There has been a realization that information is a powerful
resource. 01 The result is that the government prohibits the use of foreign equipment or services to keep the revenues within the country, and
to encourage, or even !to force, local industries to upgrade their own
97 Id.

98 For example, the administrative need for information includes data for effective crime detection and prevention, fire protection, and public health care. Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, supra note
87, at 249-50.
99 For discussion of the individual privacy interests, see supra notes 28-40 and accompanying
text.
100 Several countries are targeting the telecommunications and information industry as vital to
national growth in the 1980s. Hearings,supra note 2, at 324 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce). Mr. Geller expressed the fear that the new importance of information
will cause countries to further the development of their domestic industries through protectionist
policies. Id.
101 Louis Joinet of France stated at a 1977 Vienna symposium: "Information is power, and
economic information is economic power. Information has an economic value and the ability to
store and process certain types of data may well give one country political and technological
advantage over other countries." Eger, supra note 13, at 1065-66. It is not only governments,
however, that have recognized the need for this industry: "Telecommunications and information
resources are increasingly seen as essential to national survival. ITT succinctly captured this
theme in a recent advertisement: 'By the year 2000, a country's gross national product will largely
depend on its ability to deliver information."' Hearings,supra note 2, at 402 (statement of Russell
Pipe, President of Transnational Data Reporting Service, Inc.).
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capabilities.
While each of these interests may be more or less legitimate bases
for enacting data protection legislation, that is not the present concern.
Rather, the concern is that a combination of the rationales to create the
motivating force for legislation will also exert pressure on a government to extend the application of data protection. This may ultimately
undermine the free flow of necessary information. Their significance,
then, lies in recognizing the need to counteract this additional pressure,
rather than in determining which particular rationale is the impetus
behind a state's legislation. Provisions to avoid over-regulation are essential for any data protection law or agreement, otherwise vital information flow may be unjustifiably burdened.
VI.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION

The Council of Europe Draft Convention (C.O.E. Convention),0 3
while admirably taking great steps toward the protection of personal
privacy, has not considered at least two essentials for an international
agreement: flexibility and maximum standards. Since the ratification
of this Draft Convention seems imminent, °4 it is increasingly important to understand the potential impact of this Convention on international trade in general, and on American trade and business in
particular.10-5 A brief discussion of the essential advantages of international agreements will expose the potential problem areas in the C.O.E.
Convention. Subsequently, a review of the Convention itself will elucidate the inadequate consideration that the drafters gave to these areas.
International agreements on transborder data flow are superior to
national legislation because automatic data processing is an inherently
international discipline. New technology continually facilitates the
102 Shickich, supra note 2, at 64.
103 C.O.E. Convention, supra note 10.
104 As of the time of this writing, nine of 21 governments have signed the C.O.E. Convention,
although none have ratified it. The European Communities, however, have urged ratification.
Statement of Lucy Humer to the Working Group on Transborder Data Flows of the Advisory
Committee on International Investment, Technology and Development, Washington, D.C., Sept.
10, 1981.
105 The impact of the Convention on international trade and business may occur sooner than

expected. While most treaties enter into force only upon ratification, as does the C.O.E. Convention, many authorities find that merely signing the treaty obligates the signatory to avoid defeating
the object and purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force. Indeed, some commentators

maintain that a kind of contractual obligation begins at the same time negotiations commence.
See generally Rogoff, InternationalLegal ObligationsofSignatorlesto an Unrat/FedTreaty, 32 Mn.
L. Rv. 263 (1980). This obligation originates from article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27, reprintedin 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

4:601(1982)

travel of data across national borders. This characteristic dictates similar legal treatment for data regardless of the countries through which
the information travels. 0 6 Furthermore, the pace at which technology
is developing necessitates the sharing of limited national expertise. International cooperation may allow such sharing and avoid unnecessary
duplication or divergence of work. 0 7 Finally, transborder data flow

impacts on fundamental human rights, rights which should be protected equally for all humans, without regard to nationality, by harmonizing national laws. 108 Any international agreement on transborder
data flow must remain flexible enough to adapt to the fast-paced, rapidly changing technology that characterizes the telecommunications
and information industry. Such an agreement cannot bind its signatories to terms which will soon be outdated and burdensome. In addition
to setting minimum standards of data protection, an international
agreement on transborder data flow must contain maximum standards
in order to prevent the over-regulation of data flow which potentially
may curtail international trade and business.0 9
The avowed purpose of the C.O.E. Convention is not to prevent
data flow; rather, it is to ensure that individual liberties, especially the

right to privacy, are respected with regard to automatic data process-

ing. 110 The Council of Europe utilized the Convention to reaffirm its
member states' commitment to "freedom of information regardless of
frontiers.""'I Still, application of the Convention may actually impede
the flow of data because its provisions are too inflexible and it does not
sufficiently prevent over-regulation.
The Convention consists of three main parts: (1) "Basic Princi106 Kirby, Developing International Rules to Protect Privacy, 12 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 53, 55
(1979); Hondius, Computers.- Data Privacy, supra note 8, at 67.
107 Kirby, supra note 106, at 55; Hondius,. Computers: Data Privacy, supra note 8, at 67.
108 One United States official noted that "the dynamic nature of [information] technology and
industry also argues against taking immediate action which will be difficult to update as appropriate." Hearings, supra note 2, at 337-38 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Commerce). Similarly, it is feared that agreements would contain language inhibiting research,
development, and applications in the quickly changing technology. Id. at 221 (statement of Matthew Nimetz, Undersecretary, Department of State).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 70-87.
110o C.O.E. Convention, art. I, supra note 10. Article 1 states: "The purpose of this convention
is to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual whatever his nationality or residence,
respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard
to automatic processing of personal data relating to him ("data protection")." Indeed, Frits
Hondius, Chairman of the Public Law Division of the Council of Europe, and the driving force
behind the adoption of the convention, stated: "We passed the convention in the interest of the
free flow of information, because without international legal action, national laws were putting
heavy restrictions on transborder data flows." Dreyfack, supra note 43, at 106-08.
111 C.O.E. Convention, Preamble, supra note 10.
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pies," which outline the substantive law provision; (2) "Special Rules"
on transborder data flow; and (3) "Mechanisms for Ensuring Mutual
Assistance" between the parties." 2 In approaching the problem of privacy, the Council began by setting out, in the first part, certain core
principles found in virtually all data protection legislation. 13 These
core principles, in effect, are a minimum standard of protection that
any contracting party must provide in the automated processing of personal data. Even though the Convention enumerates minimum standards, various Convention articles also authorize one or more of the
following deviations from the core principles: the refusal to apply the
provisions of the Convention to certain types of data; I" the extension
of the Convention to cover additional types of data; 1I 5 or the applica-6
tion of stricter standards of protection than the Convention requires."
The problem with all these authorized changes in the application of
certain provisions, or even changes in the provisions themselves, is that
there is no specification of maximum protection standards. The second
part of the Convention, Special Rules, directly addresses the problem
of transborder data flow.' '7 This part, consisting of one article, article
112 ExplanatoryReport, supra note 5, at 22, para. 5.
113 The common core is based on the principles contained in resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1973. Resolution (73)22 established principles of
data protection in the private sector, and Resolution (74)29 provided similar protection in the
public sector. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMITrEE OF
MINISTERS IN THE FIELD OF CIVIL, COMMERCIAL, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973).

114 C.O.E. Convention, art. 3, § 2(a), supra note 10. Article 3, section 2, in pertinent part,
provides:
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, or at any later tune, give notice by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe:
a. that it will not apply this convention to certain categories of automated personal data
files, a list of which will be deposited.
115 Id. art. 3, §§ 2(b)-(c). Sections (b) and (c) of Article 3 provide:
b. that it will apply this convention also to information relating to groups of persons, associations, foundations, companies, corporations and any other bodies consisting directly
or indirectly of individuals, whether or not such bodies possess legal personality;
c. that it will apply this convention also to personal data files which are not processed
automatically.
116 Id. art. 11.Article II provides: "None of the provisions of this chapter shall be interpreted
as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to grant data subjects a wider measure
of protection than that stipulated in this convention."
117 C.O.E. Convention, ch. III, art. 12, supra note 10. Article 12 states:
1. The following provisions shall apply to the transfer across national borders, by whatever
medium, of personal data undergoing automatic processing or collected with a view to
their being automatically processed.
2. Party shall not, for the sole purpose of the protection of privacy, prohibit or subject to
special authorization transborder flows of personal data going to the territory of another
Party.
3. Nevertheless, each Party shall be entitled to derogate from the provisions of paragraph 2:
a. insofar as its legislation includes specific regulations for certain categories of personal
data or of automated personal data ifies, because of the nature of those data or those
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12, attempts to reconcile the Basic Principles of data protection, set out
in the first part, with the principle of free flow of information." 8 Nonetheless, this article alone, as well as in combination with provisions allowing changes in the application of protective standards, may prevent
the attainment of this objective. The third part of the Convention sets
out provisions for the mutual assistance of contracting parties in regard
to individual violations,' 9 and sets up a consultative committee to facilitate cooperation with regard to the Convention itself.' 20 This part
essentially leaves the continued vitality of the Convention to the various parties through the implementation of the Basic Principles in their

domestic law. '2'
The second part of the treaty, concerning transborder data flow, is
of primary concern to this comment. At first glance, article 12 seems to
prohibit any restrictions on data flow, at least between contracting parties, except in exceptional circumstances. Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes evident that this may not be the result in actual
practice. The article potentially allows a party to prohibit transborder
data flow to another party, or to subject the data to special authorization as long as the restriction is not "for the sole purpose of the protection of privacy." '2 2 Although the "sole purpose" provision was
originally intended to prevent the use of the Convention as a hidden
trade barrier, 23 this language may not accomplish that purpose. In
fact, it could have the opposite effect, since any other ground in addition to the privacy rationale may justify the regulation of data flow.' 24
Reciprocity or equivalency of national laws is the main enforcement mechanism of the Convention. While the Convention allows derogation from the limiting provisions of article 12,125 these derogations
are not allowed where the receiving party provides equivalent data protection. 26 Yet, the provisions permitting deviations from the core prinfiles, except where the regulations of the other Party provide an equivalent

protection;

118
119
120
121
122
123
124

b. when the transfer is made from its territory to the territory of a non-Contracting State
through the intermediary of the territory of another Party, in order to avoid such
transfers resulting in circumvention of the legislation of the Party referred to at the
beginning of this paragraph.
ExplanatoryReport, supra note 5, at 32, para. 61.
C.O.E. Convention, ch. IV, arts. 13-17, supra note 10.
Id. ch. V, arts. 18-20.
See ExplanatoryReport, supra note 5, at 25, para. 20.
C.O.E. Convention, art. 12, supra note 10.
ExplanatoryReport, supra note 5, at 33, para. 66.
The ambiguity of this provision would allow restriction of data flow regardless of the extent

of the privacy interest, as long as there is another legitimate purpose to the restriction.
125 C.O.E. Convention, art. 12, supra note 10.
126 Id.
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ciples without setting maximum standards may frustrate the goal of the
treaty because the deviations may create non-equivalent levels of protection. If unequal protection is present, article 12 permits increased
restrictions on data flow.
Once a nation enacts stricter protective standards than the Convention requires, the nation may then refuse to transfer data to any
country which has less stringent protective standards, even if both nations have complied with the core principles. 27 Thus, the failure to
provide maximum privacy standards colors the Convention with the
protectionist attitude which it avowedly is trying to avoid. 128 Although
requiring free flow of information between any countries complying
with the Convention's minimum "core" principles would also solve the
problem of uneven standards, it is unlikely that nations would be willing to agree to such a drastic reduction in their control over information. Thus, the proposal of maximum standards defining a range of
"equivalency" is a compromise position aimed at formulating some international agreement and avoiding continued reliance on national
laws.
The problem with reciprocal or equivalent standards manifests itself again in the area of sanctions and remedies.' 29 Since sanctions are
left to the contracting parties' discretion, the potential exists for widely
divergent sanctions in different countries for similar actions. One nation may maintain that a nation with less severe sanctions offers less
protection than its own because its own sanctions provide more deterrence. As a result, the country with stricter laws would be justified in
refusing to transfer data outside its national boundaries.
In addition to problems with the Convention's specific provisions,
there is the general problem of lack of flexibility. This is a result of
inexperience in the area of data protection. 30 The development of
127 For example, one party may have extended the Convention's application to protect data

pertaining to juristic persons (article 3, section 2(b) permits an extension to associations, foundations, companies, corporations, and other juristic bodies). If the potential recipient party has not
made a similar extension, the first party may legitimately refuse the transfer of data to that country by claiming that the recipient's protection is not equivalent. Under the current language of the
Convention, this situation could occur even where the prospective recipient has otherwise complied with the terms of the treaty. Moreover, the first party has almost total discretion, since under
article 12, section 3(a) it may refuse to transfer the data merely due to the nature of the data. The

other provisions allowing unlimited changes in certain protective standards may undermine the
goal of the Convention in similar manners.
128 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
129 C.O.E. Convention, art. 10, supra note 10. Article 10 states: "The Parties undertake to

establish appropriate sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of domestic law giving
effect to the basic principles for data protection set out in this chapter."
130 Hearings, supra note 2, at 324 (statement of Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary of Coin-

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

4:601(1982)

technological capabilities to conduct the type of activities with which
the Convention is concerned has occurred only recently. The newness
of the field, combined with continued rapid advancements, indicates
that any agreement may quickly become obsolete and unworkable.,3"
Perhaps voluntary guidelines that do not impose binding legal sanctions would be more beneficial until there is a better understanding of
the precise scope and limits of this new area of telecommunications and

transborder information

flow.'
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There is no doubt that international

agreement can promote the resolution of transborder data flow issues.
However, more progress is necessary before a binding treaty is enacted,
otherwise many issues may remain unresolved and left to a slow
amendment process. 33 Unnecessary and slow procedural processes
have no place in today's rapidly developing world of computer technology. The enactment of the Convention in its present form may
greatly harm American trade and business. The requirement of
equivalent standards of protection may be more difficult to satisfy than
the "adequate" protection standard contained in most of the current
national legislation.1 34 Consequently, the Convention, by not setting
maximum standards, may curtail information flow even more than
present legislation. An inflexible treaty without provisions for rapid
adaptation to technological developments may produce substantial
losses. Furthermore, these harms may result whether or not the United
States is a party to this treaty, since the United States relies on information flow to and from many countries who would be parties. 35 Thus, it
is critical for the United States to take a strong and comprehensive
stance on transborder data flow issues to achieve an improved international agreement.
merce). Mr. Geller recognized that the relative newness of this body of law could easily lead to
the inadvertent use of terminology which would quickly prove to be burdensome.
131 See generally Kirby, supra note 107, at 55. For example, the notion of "databank" is already outdated under some laws since the manipulation of data may occur without any permanent
records. Hondius, Computers: DataPrivacy, supra note 8, at 67.
132 This is one of the advantages to the OECD Guidelines, see supra note 11. These guidelines
are similar to the C.O.E. Convention, except they are not binding, calling instead for voluntary
compliance. For an analysis of these guidelines, see Kirby, supra note 107.
133 C.O.E. Convention, art. 21, supra note 10. This article sets out the amendment process for
the Convention. It involves the convening of several administrative groups, as well as notification
of all contracting parties. In addition, each contracting party must approve any amendment. The
laboriousness of this process exacerbates the detrimental impact of a binding, inflexible convention. See Kirby, supra note 107, at 55-56.
134 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
135 The provisions discussed in this comment have been regulations that are permissible between parties to the Convention. The permissible regulation on data transfer to non-parties is
even broader. See C.O.E. Convention, supra note 10.
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CONCLUSION

The computer's technological developments that enhance the communications and information industry have also created serious legal
problems in the international forum. The central issue involves protecting the privacy interests of individuals, while simultaneously maintaining the free flow of information between countries. Such
information flow is the essence of international trade and business, as
well as effective government. National attempts at data protection laws
have only created more potential conflict. The divergent standards of
protection currently existing among nations may easily be used for national, self-interested purposes that eventually will impede international information flow. All nations, their governments, and their
citizens will suffer if such a blockage occurs, preventing access to
needed information. The time has come for international agreement
concerning transborder data flow. However, it still may be too early
for a binding treaty, unless that treaty provides sufficient flexibility to
respond to rapid technological changes. The information industry is
constantly changing, and an inflexible binding treaty may have difficulty adapting to those changes. Additionally, it is essential that any
international agreement set maximum and minimum limits on the
amount of privacy protection that is permissible or required. Without
such limits, even an international agreement may result in conflicting
standards of protection, creating the blockage of information transfer.
The Council of Europe has concerned itself with protecting personal privacy with regard to the automatic processing of data; however,
its Convention does not sufficiently consider the need for flexibility or
the need for maximum limits on protection. Without provisions allowing increased flexibility and providing maximum standards, the
present Convention could have a significant adverse impact on international trade in general, and especially on American trade, due to the
prominence of the United States in the information industry. The
United States, as the world leader in information technology, must take
the initiative to formulate new guidelines that will take these essential
factors into account. Such an effort may demonstrate that privacy and
free flow of information are in fact compatible interests. Hopefully,
United States efforts would aid in a new treaty proposal when the communications industry has developed sufficiently to warrant a binding
international agreement.
Jane A. Zimmerman

